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Abstract
Multi-agent systems are promising as models of organization because they are
based on the idea that most work in human organizations is done based on
intelligence, communication, cooperation, and massive parallel processing. They
offer an alternative for system theories of organization, which are rather  abstract
of nature and do not pay attention to the agent level. In contrast, classical
organization theories offer a rather rich source of inspiration for developing multi-
agent models because of their focus on the agent level. This paper studies the
plausibility of theoretical choices in the construction of multi-agent systems.
Multi-agent systems have to be plausible from a philosophical, psychological, and
organizational point of view. For each of these points of view, alternative theories
exist. Philosophically, the organization can be seen from the viewpoints of
realism and constructivism. Psychologically, several agent types can be
distinguished. A main problem in the construction of psychologically plausible
computer agents is the integration of response function systems with
representational systems. Organizationally, we study aspects of the architecture
of multi-agent systems, namely topology, system function decomposition,
coordination and synchronization of agent processes, and distribution of
knowledge and language characteristics among agents. For each of these aspects,
several theoretical perspectives exist.
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21. Introduction
Multi-agent systems are promising as models of organization because they are
based on the idea that most work in human organizations is done based on
intelligence, communication, cooperation, and massive parallel processing. They
offer an alternative for system theories of organization, which are rather  abstract
of nature and do not pay attention to the agent level. In contrast, classical
organization theories offer a rather rich source of inspiration for developing multi-
agent models because of their focus on the agent level (Paragraph 2).
This paper discusses the question “wh ch theoretical choices are the most
plausible in the construction of multi-agent systems from a philosophical,
psychological, and organizational point of view?”. In this discussion, three concepts
can be seen as central: the concept of agent, the concept of architecture, and the
concept of (emergent) organizatio al characteristics, or, for short, organizational
performance. It turns out that, in defining these concepts, we touch upon all sorts of
problems and approaches that are described in philosophy, in cognitive science or
artificial intelligence and in organization and management theory. In analyzing these
problems and approaches, it turns out that the philosophical point of view one takes is
the most fundamental one. Take, for example, the concept of architecture. What is an
architecture? Is there a theory about the emergence and evolution of organizational
architecture? Modern organization and management theory says that the answer to this
question depends on the point of view taken. According to the machine metaphor of
organization, architectur  is the way the organization is builtout of its basic
components: agents, material objects, work constellations, communication paths, and
their spatio-temporal ordering. The machine metaphor approach can be seen as being
based on the philosophical point of view of ontological, objective realism. According
to the organism metaphor of organizations, the architecture of an organization is the
way the organization is composed of suborganizations fulfilling a specific function;
these suborganizations can be decompos d into smaller suborganizations, nd so on.
In many cases, the organism metaphor uses the language of general systems theory.
This variant of the organism metaphor approach can be seen as being based on the
philosophical point of view of Platonic realism, especially if one considers the reality
assigned to abstract mathematical system concepts. According to the ecology
metaphor of organization, architecture is the natural and agent-made environment in
which agents are wandering around in order to fulfill their needs. The ecology
metaphor approach can be subsumed under objective realism favoured by a kind of
natural constructivism. According to the mind metaphor of organizations, architecture
is the collection of symbol structures, including the rules that govern the use and
production of those symbol structures, that is present in the organization. Culture,
language and knowledge are connected to the use and production of symbol structures
3(or signs, in terms of Peirce). The mind metaphor approach can be seen as being based
on the philosophical pragmatism or semiotic constructivism.
Let us return to our question about the theoretical choices that have to be
done when constructing multi-agent systems. Choices are necessary at a
philosophical level, at a psychological level, and at an organizational or
architecture level. For each of these choices, alternative theories exist.
Philosophically, the organization can be seen from the viewpoints of realism and
constructivism. The concept of architecture is necessary to understand
organization as a principle of arrangement. However, an organization also can be
viewed as an entity. The status of this entity depends on the philosophical point of
view taken (paragraph 3). Psychologically, several sorts of agents can be
distinguished, based on the concepts of response function and representatio . A
main problem in the construction of psychologically plausible computer agents is
the integration of response function systems with representational systems
(paragraph 4). Organizationally, we study aspects of the architecture of multi-
agent systems, namely topology, system function decomposition, coordination and
synchronization of agent processes, and distribution of knowledge and language
characteristics among agents. For each of these aspects, several theoretical
perspectives exist (paragraph 5). A research program that aims at testing
organization theories based on the construction of multi-agent systems is
explained (paragraph 6). In paragraph 7, we draw some conclusions.
2. Multi-agent systems as a new perspective in
organization theory
In this paragraph, we review several organizational theories with respect to
assumptions on agents, architectures, and the resulting performance.
2.1. Classical organization theories
Classical organization theories are, surprisingly, relatively rich because of their
focus at the agent level. They are related to the machine metaphor and the
topology of objects and agents architecture. The classical organization theories of
Taylor, Fayol, and Weber, subsumed by Morgan (1986) under the machine
metaphor, see an organization as a whole consisting of agents performing tasks.
There is a fixed structure of agent tasks and agent communication. Virtually no
attention is paid to symbol structures. Fayol's (1916) management principles can
be applied in multi-agent systems. Interesting principles concern specialization
related to learning and the communication speed resulting from communication
topologies.
42.2. System theories of organization
System theories of organization are related to the organism metaphor and the
system function architecture. The organistic organization theories, for instance
contingency theory (Burns and Stalker, 1961: Woodward, 1965: Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967), adopt a system-theoretical approach to organizations. In this
approach, the organization as a whole is seen as the basic object. This object can
be decomposed in subsystems, each of which has a function in the system as a
whole. These subsystems can be decomposed further, and so on. The way of
thinking of the system theoretical approach is top-down, and opposes the bottom-
up way classical organization theories see organizations.
System-theoretical organization theories often do not descend to the
concrete level of human agents. Therefore, they lack the richness stemming from a
psychologically plausible model of human behavior. Systems theory sees an
organization as a black box. The behavior of the system as a whole is visible on
the outside of the black box. The behavior of the human agents is invisible in the
darkness of the inside of the black box. A consequence of this black box nature of
systems theory is that the operationalization of theoretical concepts leading to
measurable indicators is a rather difficult step. Because of this rather abstract
character of system theoretical organization theories, their content is relatively
poor, as has been shown by an analysis of their conceptual framework
(Gazendam, 1993). The system-theoretical approach to organizations, as far as it
stays at the level of the system as a whole, tends to be an unfruitful Lakatosian
research program (Kieser and Kubicek, 1983).
The strong point of systems theory is that it offers a set of abstract
principles that stimulate your fantasy in interpreting organizational situations.
The most important of these principles is the Law of Requisite Variety. Ashby's
Law of Requisite Variety states that the variety of control measures must match
the variety of disturbances. "Only variety in R [the regulator's actions] can force
down the variety due to D [the disturbant's actions]; only variety can destroy
variety." (Ashby, 1956/1970: 110)4. In other words, only variety can control
variety.
                                            
4  In another formulation of his Law of Requisite Variety, Ashby states that the capacity
of the channels of communication to be used for perceiving the disturbances and for
transmitting the control measures must match the capacity of the disturbance generator.
"R's capacity as a regulator cannot exceed R's capacity as a channel of communication."
(Ashby, 1956/1979: 115). This means that the capacities of the channels of
communication used limit the variety of control measures that effectively can be
applied.
5The use of Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety may be criticized because of its
mechanistic and oversimplified vision on organizations as systems. The use of a more
generalized form of Ashby's law takes the edge off this possible criticism (Gazendam,
1993). In a more generalized form, Ashby's law may be seen as governing the
response function of an organization on changing (internal or external) circumstances.
This interpretation is consistent with (1) Ashby's original game-theoretical notion of
the role of variety, and (2) the system-theoretical principle that organizations can be
investigated at various levels of abstraction with various time scales.
Ashby's law is an example of a rather abstract system-theoretical theory that
can be interpreted in many ways. By a suitable interpretation, it is also applicable to
multi-agent systems and can predict a better performance of a multi-agent system than
a single-agent system because the variety of agents and agent processes in a multi-
agent system generally will lead to a more optimal variety. In a similar way, it is
possible to use several general system-theoretical principles or theories for predicting
that multi-agent systems are better than single-agent systems. Examples of such
principles or theories are:
- stability (stress localization; Simon's principle of near decomposability)
- variety (Ashby's law of requisite variety);
- information processing capacity (Galbraith's analysis; De Leeuw's law of
planning and control effectiveness);
- complexity reduction (Simon's principle of satisficing and bounded
rationality; Pylyshyn's complexity profiles of architectures);
- learning based on response functions (Cohen's law of specialization and
cooperation);
- growth (optimal organization module size; Kastelein and BSO's cellular
design); inheritance and evolution as related principles.
In models of computational ecologies (Huberman and Hogg, 1988; Kephart,
Hogg, and Huberman, 1989), entropy and chaos emerge as characteristics at the
system level.
This use of these abstract system-theoretical notions is not without danger. The
operationalization of the abstract concepts used is a difficult path that requires
additional, secondary, theories. One is never sure whether a slightly different
operationalization of the abstract principle exists that predicts totally different effects.
2.3. Knowledge-based multi-agent theories
An agent is an autonomous and intelligent being. Examples are a human being, or
a simulator of a human being in the form of a more or less autonomous and
intelligent entity realized by software running on a computer system. The latter
agent type will be called a computer agent. A multi-agent system is a system
consisting of agents that communicate and cooperate. Human agents as well as
computer agents can participate in multi-agent systems. Multi-agent systems that
6consist purely of human agents have been studied by organization and
management theorists during at least a century. The autonomy and intelligence
aspects of the agent concept, and the resulting questions about communication
and coordination in multi-agent systems, however, form a new perspective in
organization and management theory. Multi-agent systems that consist purely of
computer agents are mainly used as simulation models of human organizations,
but can be used to perform certain tasks also. Multi-agent systems that consist of
human agents as well as computer agents have been studied as environments for
computer supported cooperative work, as expert systems, and as decision support
systems (Gazendam, Jorna, and Blochowiak, 1991).
Multi-agent systems in the role of simulation models of human
organizations offer an intriguing perspective for studying those organizations.
Instead of hierarchically structured computer programs, multi-agent simulation
models of organization offer a bottom-up perspective: based on the capabilities of
agents and the resulting communication and cooperation, emerging characteristics
of the organization as a whole can be defined, discovered, or explained. Because
most work that is done in human organizations is based on intelligence,
communication, cooperation, and massive parallel processing, multi-agent
simulation models seem to offer a promising, plausible model of organization.
Moreover, the local intelligence and parallel processing features of multi-agent
computer systems offer a promise of overcoming present bottlenecks in
computerized problem solving.
Multi-agent theory combines the instruments of system theory with the
attention for the agent level of the classical theories. Multi-agent organization
theory tries to explain the behavior at the systems level based on insight into the
agent level of organizations. This leads to a picture of organizations that has
advantages over the systems theoretical picture at the following points:
1. a psychologically plausible account of human behavior can be given;
2. the operationalization of theoretical concepts into measurable indicators is
less problematic;
3. the black box of the organization as a system is opened, and organizational
behavior can be explained as based on the (aggregated) behavior of agents;
4. the agent concept and the idea of agent interaction leading to emergent
organizational behavior offer a good starting point for computer simulation
models.
These advantages of multi-agent theories over systems theory have as a
consequence that multi-agent theory has more intriguing theoretical perspectives
and empirical research questions to offer than systems theory. In other words,
multi agent theory has the potential to be a more fruitful Lakatosian research
program. The development of multi-agent organization theories following the
7decision-making oriented tradition of the Simon and March school can be seen as
a reaction on the stagnation of system-theoretical organization theory.
Multi-agent theory tries to combine the ecology metaphor with the mind
metaphor. In the ecology metaphor, agents are autonomous beings with metabolism,
able to renew and reproduce themselves (Dyson, 1988). The ecological agents wander
around in a natural and agent-made environment, seeking for fulfillment of their needs.
The ecological agent is a well-developed response function agent (see paragraph 4). In
the mind metaphor, organizations are seen as consisting of intelligent agents that
communicate. The architecture of an organization is seen as composed of knowledge
distributed over agents. The typical mind metaphor agent is a representational agent
(see paragraph 4). The combination of the capabilities of a response function agent
with those of a representatio al agent, and the combination of an ecology metaphor
architecture with a mind metaphor architecture ar  main research questions in the
construction of multi-agent systems.
Defining, measuring, and predicting performance based on knowledge-based
multi-agent theories is a complex task. Firstly, there is the complexity and normative
value hidden in the performance concept, as will be shown below. Secondly, there is
the recursive nature of the knowledge concept (an agent knows of an agent that knows
of an agent, and so on) leading to so-called endomorphic systems (Zeigler, 1990) that
complicates modeling. Dennett (1978) has called this higher order intentionalities.
Thirdly, only rather abstract, economical theories like agency theory and Williamson's
theory are available to interpret the results of running multi-agent models like multi-
agent SOAR (Carley, Hansen, Newell, and Prietula, 1992).
According to the pragmatic philosophers, performance should be measured in
terms of maximum usefulness in serving our needs, reasonableness, and aesthetic
value rather than using procedures, theories, abstract principles, or norms that are
fixed and stem from dogmas or authority. The criterion of usefulness in serving our
needs is always relative to some given point of view and purposes. The perceived
usefulness is dependent on the biologically and socially evolved modes of adaptation
and control of humanity. The criterion of reasonableness i  based on the ideas of
pluralism and of truth as a quality that is established intersubjectively, and that is time-
dependent because of the ongoing investigation of reality. Peirce regards
reasonableness as the ultimate end of all existence. According to Peirce, aesthetic
value can be seen as being related to playfulness: the play element can be seen as the
major factor in all art and even religious contemplation (Wiener, 1973: 569).
83. Philosophical views on organization
3.1. What are organizations?
Organizations do exist. This assertion is easily made, but presupposes a bundle of
distinct beliefs, such as that the concept of organization h s an extension (in the
logical sense) or that entities that are not visible can be perceived or that reality
can be described in layers or levels. We are talking here about organizations as
entities, not as principles of arrangement. Because of the weak, that is to say
theory-dependent, definition of organization, it is not uncommon in organizational
theory to discuss the concept in terms of metaphors and paradigms (Morgan,
1986).
In preceding decades a (profit or nonprofit) organization cosisted of buildings,
factories, offices or comparable things in which people and machines in one way or
another were tuned into one another. In the recent past this situation has already
changed a bit and it will change more dramatically in the near future. Intelligent com-
puters, data processing structures, informatio  exchange procedures and com-
munication architectures will lead to questions such as “where is the organization?",
“where is the information?”, “where is the communication?” and even “where is the
human being or agent?”. Before we continue this discussion, we firstly look at
philosophical views on organizations. Doing things with and in organizations strongly
depends on the view on organizations. At least two (extreme) positions are possible:
the first position, realism, sees an organizati n as n object, the second position,
constructivism, views an organizatio  as a construction.
3.2. Realism
Hard core classical realism represents a perspective in which it can be defended
that organizations are objects. Realism is the view that physical (and many
nonphysical) objects exist independently of being perceived. Thus understood,
“realism obviously reaffirms the standpoint of common sense” (Flew, 1979). “To
exist, to be an entity, to have ontological status are the same.” (Bergmann, 1967:
3) and Hacking (1983) says about scientific realism that "entities, states and
processes described by correct theories really do exist". (p. 21) Physical things
are not the only real objects, as a matter of fact many perceivable things are part
of the real world. In this sense organizations are part of reality independent of
(specific) perceivers. Stated differently, although organizations may consist of
many components and aspects, they exist on their own and can be studied on their
own. As indicated, this position more or less corresponds to the common sense
view on reality. Organizations as well as cars, electrons and stars are all part of
reality and can be studied independent from perceivers. The differences become
9visible as soon as research rs try to describe the different objects in reality. Then,
metaphors and analogies lead to different descriptions and sometimes even to
different description languages. In the case of organizational theories (OMT) this
leads to different predictions about the nature and the structure of organizations.
In our opinion many researchers of organizations implicitly hold this realist point
of view. Organizations are existing entities in a real world and through the
different language descriptions an organizatinal "h rd core" can be detected and
revealed.
3.3. Constructivism
The other extreme position is nominal or social con tructivism. Constructivism is
the view that entities exist only if they can be constructed (or, intuitively shown to
exist), and that statements are true only if a constructive proof can be given
(Flew, 1979). Although constructivism originally was developed as a reaction
against the platonist view on (mathematical) entities, its meaning has been
expanded to other non-directly observable ntities. This meant that organizations,
institutions or companies can be studied as constructed entities. The prefix
"social" refers to the sort of entities we are talking about. The other prefix
"nominal" philosophically needs much more elaboration. Nominalism on the one
hand is the view that universals such as redness are names and do not have an
independent meaning, which makes nominalism to be contrary to platonic realism.
On the other hand it is the modern doctrine that says that "the use of general terms
that accounts for their meaning, and denotation, is in the mutual resemblance of
the particular things to which they can be applied, or the recurrence in them of the
general property indicated." (Flew, 1979: 232) This nominalist position is most
strongly defended by Goodman (1972; Goodman and Elgin, 1988). "In describing
an object, we apply a label to it. Typically that label belongs to a family of
alternatives that collectively sort the objects in a domain. Such a family of
alternatives may be called a scheme, and the objects it sorts its realm." (Goodman
and Elgin, 1988: 7) This leads to the conclusion that in fact there only are labels
that are expressed in symbols. This not only includes symbols used in languages,
but also symbols in pictorial, notational or other representational systems. The
only thing we can be sure about in the end is that in describing reality we work
with all kinds of symbol systems. Symbol systems are artifacts (Goodman and
Elgin, 1988; see also: Simon, 1969) which, certainly according to Goodman and
Elgin, means that organizations also are artifacts. Applied to organizational
theory a constructivist position implies that an organization is constructed on the
one hand by the symbol systems we use in describing complicated action p tterns
between natural and artificial agents, and on the other hand results as a symbol
system out of these interactions. An organizati n, therefore, is a constructed
reality and exists as long as the interacting agents and their teamwork exist.
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3.4. Ontological and semiotic engineering
The realist as well as the constructivist view are two rather well defined positions
regarding organizations (Morgan, 1986; Gazendam, 1993). Intermediate positions
are also possible, but we leave that for what it is worth. Interesting in relation to
the topic of the article is the discussion about what the theoretical consequences
are for multi-agent systems, for organizational architectures and for information
and communication. The realist and constructivist view also have their
repercussions for how to analyze and advice organizational structures and
changes. A realist position implies that an organizati n exists in reality,
independent from its perception by human beings and the conceptual apparatus
they use. Therefore, an integrated framework for the description and design of
organizations can be developed. This integrated descriptive framework can be
seen as an o tology, a system of hypotheses about the objects and structures that
exist. The ontology develops based on practical experience and discussion in the
scientific community. Analysis, design and change use this relatively stable
framework of description. The philosophically applicable term for this activity is
ontological engi eering.
The situation is largely different for a (nominalist) constructivist position. In
this case there is no well defined object called "organization". An organization is a
descriptive construction and therefore it is very difficult to develop an integrated
descriptive framework for organizations. The description influences the constructed
reality and at the same time the dynamics of the construction continually change the
description. Analysis, design and change therefore very much depend upon the symbol
systems used in the description. The attempt to develop an integrated framework, one
language of description, is seen as uninteresting and even impossible. In contrast with
ontological engineering we call this activity sem otic engineering.
Because of the artifact nature of the organization concept, we tend to a
constructivist, semiotic engineering point of view. Organizations are constructs of the
human mind, and can be studied by several conceptual systems or language systems
that are not necessarily compatible. The consequences for the construction of multi-
agent models is that one should be very careful in handling objects that represent the
concept of ‘organization’. A direct representation of this concept should be avoided. If
representation is necessary, it should be done as a kind of instrument in the agent’s
mind, not as a separate entity. In the eye of the investigator using multi-agent models,
emergent properties of the organization as a whole are interesting. In determining these
emergent properties, the investigator should delineate the organization as a collection
of agents that share a certain property such as a contract, or that have established a
certain type of cooperation.
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4. Psychologically plausible agents
4.1. Aspects of agents
Normally, an organization consists of an architectu e b ing the cement, or the
glue between many agents. The levels of complexity of architectures and agents
define the complexity level of the organization. We discussed architecture in
paragraph 3, now we will analyze agents. Agent sorts can be discerned regarding
the presence or absence of the following compoents:
a) perception,
b) interaction (including learning in the sense of habit formation),
c) representation and interpretation (including learning in the sense of
chunking) and
d) autonomy and self-repair.
With perception we mean that a system must be able to accept input in a
general sense. This input may include visible, audible and tangible stimuli and the
accepting system may vary from a lobster to a human being or even a computer
system. Interaction is the process by which a system has contact with its environment.
Stimuli as input in the system lead to output in the sense of responses. The reaction
patterns of the system may result in learned behavior, that is to say that the habits are
formed.
A system that internally symbolizes the environment is said to have
representations at its disposal. Representations consist of sets of symbol structures on
which operations are defined. Examples of representations are words, pictures,
semantic nets, proposition  or temporal strings. A representational system learns by
means of chunking mechanisms and symbol transformations (Jorna, 1990; Jorna and
Simons, 1992). A system is self-reflective if it is has a representation of itself,
including its own position in the environment. This means that the system has self-
representation, and can act based on this self-representation.
A system is said to be autonomous or self-organized if it can maintain itself in
its environment based on its own action and its own learning. The knowledge of an
autonomous system is only partially ‘innate’, and is largely acquired based on learning
by experience or imitation. An autonomous system has the abilities to repair itself and
return to a healthy state. It can handle goals in order to be able to attain a healthy or a
desired state.
4.2. Sorts of agents
The four aspects contain a sort of agent hierarchy. An agent that only has per-
ception at his disposal is at the lowest level and can hardly be called an
(intelligent) agent, whereas an agent with self-organization is the highest level and
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normally has perception, interaction nd representations. This last form is what
we regularly call an agent that is reflective, intelligent and thoughtful. We
consider humans beings to be good instantiations of these intelligent agents,
whereas other mammals can ultimately go as far as to have representations.
Computers do not fit in this picture at all or are said to have representations, but
not self-organization. This depends on what one's definition of intelligence
contains. One can understand that in the discussion of an organization as a multi-
agent system it really depends on the characteristics of the agents, humans as well
as computers, whether an organization is an intelligent system.
Not every agent is intelligent and not every intelligent system is an agent. The
above described classification in perception, interaction, representatio  and autonomy
can be related to qualification of agents. First we make a distinction in single age ts
and multiple agents. Second we subdivide agents in response function agents,
representational agents and representational response function agents. W  consider
an agent to be a system consisting of several components, for example motor parts,
sensory parts, including perception, and cognitive parts. The parts will not be
discussed in detail in this article (see Posner, 1989; Newell, 1990). Concerning
multiple agents the surplus component is a communication and coordination
mechanism, that realizes the working of the interaction of agents. This mechanism has
to be intelligent, but in contradistinction to the coordination within a single agent, does
not have a physical or physiological basis as the carrier of the mechanism (Simon,
1945; Newell and Simon, 1976).
4.3. The response function agent
We start with an environment in which a system is present. The system is a cohe-
sive, structured and organized entity. This entity operates in an environment, but
no specifications of its operations are given. In a sense this entity is an agent,
because it is self-contained, strives towards continuation and, if we look at the
agent characteristics, it has perception and interaction including the possibility of
learning in the sense of habit formation. It is emphasized that this agent does not
have internal representations. Its cognitive domain is absent or empty. We call
this agent a response function agent and it can be compared with the ant in the
sand (Simon, 1969). Simon defends the position that the behavior of this ant can
be called complex, although not intelligent, because it is a function of the
complexity of the sandy environment that it has to cross. The ant perceives,
interacts, uses his motor parts and even learns in the sense of habit formation.
4.4. The representational agent
Keeping the environment the same we can conceive another agent that we call a
representational agent. This agent has representations at its disposal and is able
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to project external events internally into its cognitive domain. As already stated
representations consist of symbol structures on which operations or manipulations
are defined. Normally this agent is called an intelligent or cognitive agent. A
representational agent has perception, representation and autonomy. The interac-
tion is problematic, that is to say that there is no device that semantically
interprets causal input and output. The most extreme view concerning interaction
has been defended by Chomsky and Fodor, who in relation to cognitive processes
argue in favor of philosophical rationalism. This position is closely connected to
nativism. The nativist position sees agents as self-contained and self-oriented.
This position also can be called methodological solipsism. As far as we talk about
interaction it is rather low level reaction to stimuli. If we look at present day
cognitive science most linguistically and logically oriented researchers have such
a kind of agent in mind. Another problematic aspect of representational systems
concerns the meaning of representation. Representation has many interpretations
and it is not always clear which reading is the correct one: representation as
process, as description structure or as one, two or three place predicate
(Goodman, 1968/1981; Jorna, 1990).
4.5. The representational response function agent
If we keep the environment still the same, the third possible interpretation of an
agent is the r presentational response function agent. This agent incorporates a
really intelligent, interactive and cognitive system. It is able to perceive, to
interact, to represent and to be autonomous. Cognitive processes include symbols,
operations and semantic interpretable response functions. The goal of cognitive
science is to model this sort of agents and to mimic them to a certain extent in
computer systems. Representational response function systems behave on the
knowledge level, as Newell called it. "There exists a distinct computer syste s
level, lying immediately above the symbol level, which is characterized by know-
ledge as the medium and the principle of rationality as the law of behavior."
(Newell, 1982: 99) The agent equipped with the integration of representations and
response has knowledge. "Knowledge", says Newell, "is whatever can be ascribed
to an agent, such that its behavior can be computed according to the principle of
rationality." (Newell, 1982: 105) The principle of rationality is expressed in the
belief that an acting person will undertake those actions by which his goals are
reached. In fact, we are dealing here with a variant of what Newell and Simon
(1972) have called: "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1945). Until now cognitive
scientists have not succeeded in reaching the goal of underst nding i  detail this
sort of agents, although the latest developments in SOAR (standing for state,
operator, and result) come close to what is ultimately possible with the symbolic
approach in Artificial Intelligence.
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4.6. Multi-agent systems
The hierarchy of single agents returns in the composition of mult -agent systems.
In the first place it is possible to have multi-agents consisting of several response
function systems. The situation is comparable to the single agent system in that
the agents do not have internal representations. In this circumscription of multi-
agents the other agents are considered as parts of the environment. The only
difference is that there is a proximal and a distal environment. The system borders
define an inner and an outer area. The agents all have perception and interaction
at their disposal. To take up the example of Simon's ant we are talking here about
a group of ants perceiving and interacting with each other. Coordination is absent
or only defined in terms of reactions to behavior of other agents.
In the second place we have multi-agents consisting of representational systems.
Each of these agents has internal representations in the sense of symbol structures and
operations upon them, but there is no guarantee that symbol structures are similar and
thereby communicative, although it might be expected that they all use one or another
form of Mentalese, as Fodor (1975) suggested. In the same way as it holds for the
single agent representational system it is of course doubtful whether interaction
between the agents is semantically meaningful. For this is a weak point in the extreme
version of present day cognitive science. In discussions about social cognition the issue
of semantic interaction is ticked off, but not resolved. Intelligent coordination is hardly
handled.
In the third place there are the representational response function systems in a
multi-agent situation. The agents perceive each other and react to each other in a
semantically rich and intelligent way. There might be a difference in the interaction
patterns related to the environment compared to interactions with other agents within
the area boundaries. Each agent has perception, interaction, representation and
autonomy and manages to integrate this into the organization as a multi-agent system.
If we look at the six appearances of single and multiple agents and try to find
examples of each of them in organizational settings (humans and computers) we see
the following. Concerning single agents a connectionist machine is an example of a
response function system, an expert system an example of a representational system
without, however, the autonomy characteristic and a human information processing
system an example of a representational response function system. Concerning
multiple agents, examples of multi-agent response function systems are computer
networks. Combinations of expert systems and humans are examples of multi-agent
representational systems, whereas examples of multi-agent representational
response function systems do not exist, besides perhaps an idealized group of human
information processing systems. With respect to the hierarchies of single and multiple
agents it should be noted that a higher level system exhibits the functions of a lower
level system whereas the other way around is not applicable. This holds for single
agents as well as for multiple agents.
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4.7. Intelligent multi-agent systems?
One conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that modeling an intelligent agent
is not yet completely realized within cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
This sort of agent, however, is necessary for the construction of intelligent multi-
agent systems. So, there is a gap between what is required and what can be
realized by present day science. On the other hand organizational theory speaks
about the coordination of multiple intelligent agents, but defines agents as sort of
response function systems without any internal representation. These are not the
sort of agents we strive after. So, cognitive science cannot model the multiple
agent situation OMT should ask for, whereas OMT takes for granted a sort of
multiple agent system that is not sufficiently equipped in order to behave
intelligently.
The interesting point of looking at an organization as a semiotic entity cannot
only be found in semiotic engineering, but also in the different sorts of signs that turn
up in the communication and information structures of the various single and multiple
agents. In semiotics it is normal to distinguish signals from signs and to subdivide
signs in icons, indexes and symbols. Icons emphasize the similarity aspect, indexes the
contiguity aspect and symbols the conventional aspect of signs. Signaling is equivalent
with reporting and registration, while working with signs involves representing and
interpreting. Signaling is a causal relation, whereas representing is mainly semantic.
Considering the sorts of single and multiple agents, only the response function
systems work with causal relations, that is to say that the information exchange and
the comunication structures are in terms of signals. Representational systems work
with icons, indexes and symbols, that is to say with semantic entities and relations.
Response function systems and representational systems are mainly segregated. This
means that the causal realm is largely isolated from the semantic realm. Developments
within cognitive science and connectionism show that the latter is oriented at the
symbolic or semantic domain, while the former is directed at the causal domain. The
integration really takes place in the representational response function systems and
these are the sorts of systems cognitive science as well as connectionism are striving
to.
The analysis of the sorts of single and multiple agents shows that different sorts
of agents emerge in organizations as well as in organizational theory. Combined with
the semiotic analysis of signal and sign patterns between agents it is now possible to
locate the assumptions within theories of organizations concerning the view on the
concept of organization, the orientation on the agent and the sort of architecture in the
organization including the level of communication.
Multi-agent representational response function systems are the most plausible
type of multi-agent systems from a psychological point of view. The problem,
however, is that they do not yet exist.
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5. The organization as a multi-agent system
5.1. The architecture of a multi-agent system
Architecture is the way in which components make up a whole. The architecture
of a multi-agent system is the way in which agents, processes performed by
agents, and symbol structures used and produced by agents make up an
organization. In order to be able to say something about the relation between
architecture and organizational performance, we must be able to distinguish
different sorts of architectures. This requires that we have an idea about which
are the relevant aspects or dimensions of a multi-agent architecture, and which
alternatives exist for each of those aspects or dimensions. Moreover, we can
define plausibility requirements based on the architecture aspects or dimensions
distinguished.
Our idea about the relevant aspects of the architecture concepts is based on an
analysis of the architecture concepts from the perspectives of the machine metaphor,
the organism metaphor, the ecology metaphor, and the mind metaphor of organization.
An organization as an artifact, a human construct that is so predominant in our social
life that we believe in the reality of the existence of it although it is no tangible object.
This dual nature of organizations (see paragraph 2), artifact and reality, accounts for
the importance of prescriptive theories in the field of organization and management
theory. Modern organization theories do not state that there is one best way to
organize, but make explicit the space of possibilities that exists for interpreting and
designing organizt ons (Morgan, 1986; Gazendam, 1993).
Important characteristics of organizations, as expressed in modern organizati n
theories, are (1) that the characteristics of the whole (the organization) are defined in
terms of the characteristics of the parts (e.g., persons), while the characteristics of t e
whole in turn influence the characteristics of the parts; (2) that (symbol) structures
created by agents like task descriptions and assignments are a source of actions by
agents, while actions by agents use resources and create, in turn, symbol structures.
This means that each analysis of organization theories must consider the following five
categories of objects and their interactio s:
- the agents in the organization:
- the organization as a whole;
- the symbol structures in the organization;
- actions by agents, together forming processes;
- resources.
Multi-agent models of organization represent a more sophisticated and refined
way of looking at organizations (Bond and Gasser, 1988; Gasser and Hill, 1990).
Besides persons or agents (which can also include intelligent computer agents),
communication channels or blackboards are distinguished as basic elements of the
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organization. Within each agent, agent knowledge is considered to be important.
Furthermore, there are dynamic processes of task allocation, cooperation, and
communication. Therefore, one can no longer speak of part qualities, actions, and
intermediate structure qualities only. A much more complicated model emerges that
can have recursive properties. Based on these considerations, the following four
aspects of the architecture of multi-agent systems are distinguished: the opology of
the components, the system function decomposition, the way of coordination and
synchronization of processes, and the distribution of knowledge and language.
5.2. The topology of the components
The topology of a multi-agent system is the way in which the basic components of
an organization are ordered in space and time. The basic components of an
organization are agents and material objects. Their ordering in space and time
takes the form of work constellations and fixed communication paths. The most
relevant alternatives that have been defined for the topology aspects are
computational markets and computational hierarchies (Malone, 1987: Malone,
Yates, and Benjamin, 1987; Miller and Drexler, 1988; Malone, 1992).
Furthermore, computational ecologies can be distinguished. I  the computational
market topology, all agents have access to a common marketplace where
information can be exchanged and negotiations take place. This topology is also
known as the blackboard architecture (Engelmore, Morgan, and Nii, 1988). A
variant on the blackboard architecture is the situation in which subdivisions of the
blackboard exist that are specialized for a certain type of communication (like the
fish market or the vegetable market). The computational hierarchy topology is
characterized by the restriction of communication and negotiation of agents to a
hierarchically strucured organization: each agent can only communicate with its
boss and its direct subordinates. According to Fayol (1916), this topology can
lead to long communication lines and tedious communication processes.
Therefore, Fayol invented the lateral communication (passerelle). This leads to
the passerelle (gangplank) variant of the hierarchical topology. Hierarchical
topologies are often connected to the notion of central power. This, howev r, is a
subject to be subsumed under the process architecture discussed below. The
fundamental concept in the computaional ecology topology (Huberman and
Hogg, 1988) is the environment, which is partially natural and partially agent
made. Agents wander in the ecological environment seeking for fulfillment of their
needs. (The environment concept of ecology has little to do with the passive and
abstract environment of continge cy theory.) The topological aspect of the
ecological environment is that at certain places, resources can be found; and that
at other places, agents, by convention, gather to do things together like buying and
selling, negotiating, cooperate in work or in pleasure, and so on. Ecological
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architectures can technically be seen as a specific refinement of the multi-
blackboard architecture, but based on a totally different basic concept.
In the multi-agent literature, there is a certain preference for decentralized
architectures and connected decentralized power structures. An example can be found
in the open system characteristics formulated by Hewitt (1985, 1986):
- massive parallelism;
- asynchrony;
- decentralized control;
- local knowledge and information that may be inconsistent;
- restriction of information exchange to explicit communication between
agents;
- accommodation of the failures of individual agents by the community of
other agents.
In the economical organization literature, on the other hand, there is a
preference for hierarchical structures and centralized authority. An example is
economic agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which supposes centralized
authority in combination with cheating behavior of the subordinates (see also Perrow,
1986: 224). We support the view of Hewitt that the real power of a multi-agent system
lies in its decentralized and localized structure, and therefore reject the assumptions
made beforehand by economical agency theory that centralized authority has to exist
and cheating is a fundamental characteristic of subordinate agents.
We see the computational ecological topology as the most promising type of
multi-agent topology. It extends the decentralized computational market topology by
introducing active, mobile  agents and notions of resources, cooperation, and
communication.
5.3. The system function decomposition
The system function decomposition aspect of the architecture of an organization
is the way the organization is composed of suborganizations fulfilling a specific
function. These suborganizations can be decomposed into smaller
suborganizations, and so on. The major alternatives for system function
decomposition found in the organization and management literature are the aspect
system decomposition, the check and balance decomposition, and the subsystem
decomposition. The aspect system decomposition, als  known as the 'functio al'
decomposition of organizations in smaller units, is based on specializati s like
production, marketing, finance, personnel, research, material management, and so
on (Stoner, 1982: 267). An alternative to the functional decomposition based on
specializations is the decomposition of functions in a web of actors that have to
maintain a system of checks and balances, like in a social and political arena.
Since Locke and Montesquieu we know that a division of powers is necessary to
avoid  arbitrariness of rule. A similar reasoning can be found in the field of the
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organization of financial administration aimed at avoiding corruption and
embezzlement. The subsystem decomposition decomposes the system into smaller
subsystems or organization modules (Kastelein), for instance based on
product/market combinations. Each subsystem has all aspects of the system as a
whole and is relatively autonomous. The aspect system decomposition generally
has a relatively centralized power structure, while the subsystem decomposition
generally has a more decentralized power structure.
The following plausibility requirements apply to the aspect of function
decomposition based on a state space model of organization:
1. learning and recursiveness in learning, which means that the system must
be able to rewrite its own program;
2. recursiveness of context in the form of several levels of response function
complexity (e.g., response functions to be used depend on current tasks and
goals, current tasks and goals depend on communication processes between
agents);
3. recursiveness of data structures of input signals, state, and output signal;
4. recursiveness of functions;
5. knowledge representation or representation of the environment as part of
the state;
6. representation of architectural components as part of the state;
7. massive parallelism of flows of input signals, flows of output signals, and
internal processing;
8. agents and communication between agents as the basic phenomena to
which data structures as well as functions are reducible;
9. clearly definable system boundaries and relations with the environment.
These plausibility requirements lead to a large field of conceptual, theoretical,
and practical problems in factoring transparent, mathematically well-defined, models
of organization. An important attempt to overcome the problems associated with the
requirements 1 to 6 described is embodied in the SOAR system (Laird, Rosenbloom,
and Newell, 1986; Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom, 1987; Newell, 1990), a plausible
simulation model of the human mind. There is no general guideline for building
symbol systems fulfilling all requirements posed above, especially the requirements 7,
8 and 9 that are specific for multi-agent systems. Anyhow, the system function
decomposition aspect of architecture as such is too abstract to be implemented directly
in multi-agent systems. It has to be translated into the topological, process, and
knowledge aspects of multi-agent architecture first. These aspects, again, have to be
translated into agent capabilities and agent behavior as the basic dispositions and
mechanisms driving a multi-agent system.
The system function decomposition aspect of a multi-agent system is a kind of
description that stems from general systems theory. It is especially applicable in multi-
agent models where agents have predetermined tasks, competences and power (and the
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emergence of such tasks , competences and power is not a subject of study). Especially
the decomposition of competences and powers based on a system of  checks and
balances is interesting for multi-agent models of organization.
5.4. Coordination and synchronization of agent processes
The way in which the coordination and synchronization of agent processestake
place is the next architecture aspect to discuss. Agent processes can be seen as
being related to the wandering around of autonomous agents in a natural and
agent-made environment, in which they cooperate in an occasional or regular
way. The basic thrust of agents is to fulfill their needs like individual survival by
maintaining their metabolism and self-renewal, and survival of the species by
reproduction (Dyson, 1988). Agent processes also can relate to perception,
communication and learning. The latter processes are explained more specifically
under the knowledge and language aspect of architecture.
Process coordination and synchronization can be described from the agent
viewpoint, adding coordination and synchronization later, or from the system
viewpoint, which means distinguishing functions and decomposing them into
processes. The agent viewpo nt is explained here; the system viewpoint is identical
with the system function decomposition aspect of architecture. The agent viewpoint
presupposes capabilities of agents to perform certain processes. These capabilities are
explained in paragraph 4. In addition, an approach to coordination and
synchronization has to be formulated.
We have identified the following approaches to synchronization, which, by the
way, do not seem to exhaust the possibilities in this field:
1. discrete event simulation;
2. Thompson's coupling mechanisms;
3. speech act theory;
4. the ecological environment in which symbol structures and signs reside;
5. protocols as describing communication standards;
6. grammars and lexicons as describing communication standards.
The discrete event simulation way to see the problem of coordination and syn-
chronization has always been strongly dependent of the difficulties in realizing
communication and synchronization between parallel processes realized in the
computer. It elaborates variants of the semaphore mechanism (Birtwistle (1979);
Goldberg and Robson (1983; 1989); Wieringa (1990)).
The coupling mechanisms distinguished by Thompson (1967) are pooled
coupling, sequential coupling, and reciprocal coupling. In pooled coupling, agents
share resources but are otherwise independent. This can be simulated effectively by
discrete event simulation. In sequential coupling, agent processes are synchronized in a
way that the results of precursor agents enable, as well as trigger, the processes of the
subsequent agent. In reciprocal coupling, sequential coupling with feedback loops or
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feed-forward loops is present. From simulation studies it is well-known that feedback
loops in simulation models can lead to cyclic or chaotic dynamic behavior of the
simulation model (Gazendam, 1990).
Speech act theory as interpreted by Schäl and Zeller (1991) elaborates
structures following from commitments already made. Coordination (denoted
coordination(1) in order to distinguish it from our general coordination concept),
collaboration, and co-decision are distinguished as forms of cooperation.
Coordination(1) is based on a decomposition of a task in subtasks to be performed by
each agent. In coordination(1), agents work independently, like in pooled coupling. In
collaboration, agents have to synchronize their actions in order to perform a task
correctly. An example is the movement of a table by human agents (Schäl and Zeller,
1991). Coordination based on sequential coupling would be a form of collaboration.
Collaboration also can involve reciprocal coupling. In co-decision, agents construct a
decision (which is a kind of symbol structure) or other artifact in a way where the
contributions of each agent are not fixed beforehand, the feed-backs during the process
of co-decision can change the task or role of each agent during the process. It is clear
that co-decision encompasses elements of reciprocal coupling.
In the ecology metaphor of organization, where agents wander around in an
environment, the existence of symbol structures and signs in the environment offers a
basis for coordination and synchronization. Remember that the environment is
partially natural and partially agent-created, the meeting places of agents, for example,
are typically places distinguished based on conventions established in communication
and expressed in symbol structures or signs. The coordination and synchronization
that happens is rooted in the environment, especially the symbol structures and signs
related to place and time.
Another way of looking at the synchronization in the ecological environment is
to see the coordination and synchronization of agent processes as, albeit facilitated by
symbol structures and signs, mainly dependent on the capabilities of agents, and the
standards of communication they have realized. There are two ways for describing
these standards of communication: by protocols and by grammars (and the related
lexicons).
Standards of communication can be described in terms of protocols. This is the
most simple solution to realize coordination and synchronization that is based on the
exchange of symbol structures between agents rather than on posting signs at a sema-
phore. Most protocols implement a specific theory of negotiation, choice, planning and
contracting. The protocols often suppose a market-like communication structure and
sometimes a coordinating agent. Well-known protocols are contract net negotiation
(Smith, 1980; Davis and Smith, 1983), partial global plans (Durfee, Lesser, and
Corkill, 1987; Durfee and Lesser, 1988), and mediated negotiation (Sathi and Fox,
1989).
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Another, in many ways complementary, method for describing communication
standards is to describe the signs or symbols used, their composition into sign
complexes or symbol structures in the form of a lexicon, and the grammar rules that
govern the use and production of these sign complexes or symbol structures. In order
to understand messages, and to produce meaningful messages, agents must have a
world view. In order to understand each other, agents must not only share (share in the
sense of 'having compatible') their world views, but also share their language systems.
The use of existing organization theories as the basis for such a world view and
language system, to be expressed in terms of grammar rules, has been explored in
earlier publications (Gazendam, 1990; 1992; 1993).
The choice between these alternative mechanisms of coordination and
synchronization is difficult, because the most sophisticated, language-oriented
mechanisms that seem to be the most plausible ones from a philosophical and
psychological point of view, are also the most difficult to implement. In practice, more
simple mechanisms like speech act theory or the ecological environment mechanism
seem to be more appropriate for the state of affairs in multi-agent modeling at this
moment.
5.5. Distribution of knowledge and language characteristics
The distribution of knowledge and language characteristics over the agents of
the multi-agent system, is an important aspect of multi-agent architecture. In the
case of (1) the co-decision type of coordination and synchronization (Schäl and
Zeller), (2) the coordination and synchronization based on conventions, symbol
structures, signs, and (3) coordination based on the agent communication that
depend on agent world views and language capabilities, the level of description
that focuses on identifying processes and the coordination and synchronization
often becomes too complex to be useful. In these cases, it is often more useful to
concentrate on the contents of communication (knowledge expressed in signs and
symbol structures) and the language system enabling communication. Culture,
language and knowledge are connected to the use and production of symbol
structures (or signs, in terms of Peirce).
Knowledge and language can be studied from a declarative, logical point of
view or from a constructivist point of view. The d clarative, logical point of view tries
to capture the possible states of the knowledge in a multi-agent system by describing
the logical conditions that have to be fulfilled by the knowledge state. This description
can be a description in general, and/or in terms of the relationships between knowledge
states in time (where time is often defined as relative to actions considered or taken by
agents), and/or in terms of relationships between the knowledge that agents have. It
turns out that the description of the possible states of knowledge of a single agent is
already very difficult, and requires a specialized logical language that is expressive
enough to describe agent knowledge, agent actions, decision-making by agents about
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actions, and the relationship between knowledge and action. Attempts to formulate
such a language often take the form of a new logical system with its own symbol set,
grammar rules, axioms, and derived statements (Masuch, 1990; Masuch and
Warglien, 1992). Classical logical models of knowledge and action are those of Moore
(1985) and Halpern and Fagin (1989). In Halpern and Fagin' s model, a fixed number
of agents are present, agents have a common memory (a kind of blackboard), there is
no private agent memory other than states, and time moves in discrete steps (which
means that it is not a discrete event model). A promising development in which several
of the limitations of Halpern and Fagin's model have been removed is the action logic
defined by Huang, Masuch, and Pólós (1991). A declarative, logical approach can
fruitfully be applied to the analysis of existing organization theories, pointing out the
weaknesses or even contradictions in those theories. Because of the complexities in the
field of logical languages, we  expect that the role of the declarative logical approach
in constructing new theories will be relatively small. Its power lies in analyzing
theories, not in inventing new ones.
The constructivist point of view do s not aim at clarifying the possible states of
knowledge of a multi-agent system, but at clarifying the processes that lead to knowl-
edge and language capabilities. Once these processes have been understood in enough
detail to simulate them, states of knowledge, and of language capabilities can be
produced by the simulation model rather than derived from logical circumscription.
Two important types of processes in the constructivist point of view are interpretation
(of the world as well as of signs, symbol structures, and messages in a language) and
learning. Other processes, like decision-making, acting, and language production
probably can be understood better if we have a better understanding of interpretation
and learning.
The interesting point of interpretation is that it sees the formation of knowledge
not as a process of perception in which the agent is rather passive, but as a process in
which the agent is active and forms a representation of the world governed by an
interpretation framework. Interpretation frameworks can differ from agent to agent,
they have been described as microtheories by Hewitt and Lenat, and as agent
grammars by Gazendam (1992).
The interesting point of learning is that knowledge is not seen as fixed, but as
fundamentally changing. Allelements of agent knowledge must have been created once
by processes of interpretation and/or learning. Interesting models of learning are
cumulative learning by neural networks and classifier systems (Wasserman, 1989;
Goldberg, 1989), learning by chunking (Laird, Rosenbloom, and Newell, 1986; Laird,
Newell, and Rosenbloom, 1987; Newell, 1990), and learning by transformation of
representations using grammars (Wand, 1993; Gazendam, 1993). Most learning,
however, is social learning by imitation and the passing of memes, packages of culture
and knowledge, in social interaction (Dawkins, 1976).
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Multi-agent systems are necessary for learning processes in which language
capabilities are learned, conventions arise, and specialized knowledge based on task
division emerges. Language acquisition of human agents, based on interaction between
these human agents, turns out to be a learning process in which the forming of conven-
tions about signs and the formation of concepts interact in a way where the signs are
dominant (Müller, 1991). Several multi-agent computer models have been made
showing aspects of multi-agent learning. Two separate learning systems (two 'agents'),
each of which develops its own specialization in a task that has to be accomplished
together, has been shown to perform better than a single learning system of
comparable total capacity (a single 'agent') (Cohen, 1992).
A structured theory of multi-agent learning, will have to account for (1) the
existence, development and use of common knowledge in organizations, and (2) the
learning processes of agents in interaction with this common knowledge. The common
knowledge in organizations (the 'culture layer') consists of a common world model,
rules and examples of expected behavior, and a common language of communication.
The learning of agents in organizations encompasses the adaptation of agents to the
organizational culture layer, changes in the culture layer, and learning patterns leading
to the emergnce of specializations and new language elements. Note that the
organization, as an entity, is unable to learn. Only gents can learn. Such a theory of
organizational, multi-agent, learning, however, has not emerged yet.
The construction of process models of  communication, interpretation and
learning seems to be a promising one for developing new perspectives, models and
theories for multi-agent systems. It weakness might be the tendency to make
overcomplex models in which it is difficult to determine the relations between the
variables used.
6. Research perspectives
6.1. A research program relating organization theories and
multi-agent systems
Organization theories sometimes predict organizational performance based on the
organization type and task environment type. We can use organization theories
for the design of multi-agent systems, and we can use multi-agent systems to test
organization theories.
Existing organization theories in the OMT literature contain knowledge that can
be used for constructing plausible multi-agent models. This knowledge, part of which
can be described in the form of an organization grammar, is used by the organization
theorist in constructing models of organization (Gazendam, 1993). Furthermore,
multi-agent models presuppose that agents have some notion of what an organization
is and how it functions. This knowledge has to be incorp rated in an agent grammar.
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Agent grammars (including a symbol and symbol structure lexicon), combined with a
control mechanism, are sufficient to specify intelligent behavior (Gazendam, 1992).
Such a specification would be fitting in the semiotic approach to multi-agent systems.
For the conceptual specification of organization theories, an ontological as well
as a semiotic method can be used (Jorna, van Heusden and Posner, 1993). An
ontological method for analyzing organization theories is, for instance, based on
ontological engineering (Lenat and Guha, 1989) or Bunge's ontology as a frame of
reference (Wand, 1993). A semiotic approach to analyzing organization theories is
offered by the CAST method (Gazendam, 1993). CAST (Conceptual Analysis and
Specification of organization Theories) aims at the translation of verbal organization
theories into a conceptual model using a BNF-like conceptual modeling language. This
conceptual model shows the theory's contents in a clear way, enabling a comparison
and analysis of theories as well as a further formalization leading to a logic model or
computer model. The CAST method shows that there is a variety of metaphors for
describing and designing organizations, and that each metaphor leads to its own
language system, system of concepts, and reasoning form.
Multi-agent models of organization can be used for testing organization
theories. In order to do this, the following steps have to be taken:
1. the realization f the process frame of the multi-agent system;
2. the realization of a specific type of agent and attaching a number of these
agents to the multi-agent frame;
3. feeding the agents with organizational knowledge;
4. exposing the multi-agent system to one or m r  task environments in order
to record performance and to test predictions of organization theories about
relationships between organization type and characteristics of the task
environment.
Step 1 consists of the realization of the process frame of the multi-agent
system. This architecture consists of a number of places where agents can be fitted in,
a global communication channel, and agent-to-agent channels. The process frame is a
kind of 'bus' to which processors or parallel processes representing agents can be
attached. Assumptions about the utilization of the global channel versus agent-to-agent
channels can give the multi-agent system a more hierarchic versus a more market-like
communication topology. Synchronization of agent processes has to be done based on
the rhythms of the behavior cycles of each agent. An example is the fundamental
'interpret-choose-act-learn' cycle of agents. Synchronization assumptions as well as
communication topology assumptions have to be made in the organization theory to be
studied. The variation of the number of agents is a subject of the process architecture.
The communication channel architecture may be dependent on the task environment;
for instance, communication may be dominated by a number of work places that are
designed as part of a production process. These work places are parts of the global
communication channel, which can have a structured (blackboard) nature. Other
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mechanisms to structure the information in the global communication channel (at the
blackboard) are agenda's, plans, requests, and agent rights.
Step 2 consists of realizing a specific type of agent and attaching a number of
these agents to the multi-agent frame. We have distinguished three basic agent types:
the response function agent, the representational agent, and representational response
function agent. Related to these agent types, we have described four layers of agent
behavior: the response function layer for low-level automated behavior, the represen-
tational layer for task-related routine behavior, the cognitive layer for reasoning about
tasks and the world, and the communication layer for understanding and producing
language. Furthermo e, agents can differ according to the learning mechanisms they
use at the behavior layers distinguished. As we have discussed above, it is necessary to
choose the agent's characteristics according to the organization theory to be studied.
Step 3 consists of feeding the multi-agent system wi h organization design
information. This can be done by offering a training to the response function layer,
symbol structures about tasks to the task execution layer, world models to the
cognitive layer, and gramm rs to the communication layer. Generally, organization
theories distinguish design parameters, design goals, and organization types related to
these design goals. Different organization types will require different organization
design information to be fed into the system.
Step 4 consists of exposing the multi-agent system (or the collection of multi-
agent systems that has been created as a result of differences in design information and
other parameters) to one or more task environments in order to record performance
and to test predictions of organization theories about relationships between
organization type and characteristics of the task environment.
6.2. Building multi-agent systems
The main question in building multi-agent systems is the integration of the follow-
ing components:
- a database program;
- a discrete event simulation shell;
- an expert system or problem solver;
- a learning component.
In hybrid, object-oriented expert system shells the expert system is dominant
(for example: NEXPERT OBJECT). In Plural SOAR (Carley, Kjaer-Hansen, Newell,
and Prietula, 1992) , the problem solver and integrated learning component are
dominant. In most existing multi-agent systems, the discrete event simulation shell is
dominant enabling the (semi) parallel existence of processes for each agent and each
blackboard during runtime. In our research, we aim at comparing these multi-agent
architectures based on their use in simulation experiments. One of these architectures
is Multi-Agent SOAR, another is a multi-agent organization modeling shell explained
below.
27
The Information Strategy Model (ISM) is a multi-agent organization model
written in Smalltalk80 (Gazendam, 1990). It simulates the choice and implementation
of information management strategies. The basic structure of the Smalltalk80
multiprocessing and simulation classes is used to model agents, objects, re ourc s and
blackboards. Some agents use a personal knowledge base to fulfill their tasks. These
knowledge bases use HUMBLE, a Smalltalk expert system shell with MYCIN-like
features. The main results of ISM are insight in the stability or instability of strategies
and the effects of long implementation trajectories on strategy choice. Based on ISM,
an multi-agent organization modeling shell has been developed, adding a better
integration of simulation shell and expert system components, a revised expert system
shell, goal-oriented behavior, learning, and representation of space as well as time.
Experiments with this multi-agent shell are a subject of ongoing research.
7. Conclusions
An organization is an artifact that is so predominant in our social life that we
believe in its existence although it is not a tangible object. Because of the artifact
nature of the organization concept, we tend to a constructivist, semiotic
engineering point of view. Organizations are constructs of the human mind, and
can be studied by several conceptual systems or language systems that are not
necessarily compatible. Semiotic engineering uses semiotic theory because of the
absence of a physiological carrier for coordination and communication between
agents.
Multi-agent systems presuppose a representational response function agent.
However, clear theories of representational response function agents do not exist, nor
do computer models of representational response function agents exist. Therefore,
plausible multi-agent systems have not been realized yet. Connectionism and cognitive
science is restricted to response function agents and representational agents. In theory
as well as in simulation and modeling environments there are several problems in
combining response function agents with represenational agents.
With respect to the organization or architecture of a multi-agent system we
have distinguished the aspects of topology, system function decomposition,
coordination and synchronization mechanisms, and knowledge and language. We see
the computational ecological topology as the most promising type of multi-agent
topology. It extends the decentralized computational market topology by introducing
active, mobile  agents and notions of resources, cooperation, and communication. The
system function decomposition aspect of a multi-agent system is a kind of description
that stems from general systems theory. It is especially applicable in multi-agent
models where agents have predetermined tasks, competences and power (and the
emergence of such tasks , competences and power is not a subject of study). Especially
the decomposition of competences and powers based on a system of  checks and
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balances is interesting for multi-agent models of organization. The choice between
alternative mechanisms of coordination and synchronization is difficult, because the
most sophisticated, language-oriented mechanisms that seem to be the most plausible
ones from a philosophical and psychological point of view, are also the most difficult
to implement. In practice, more simple mechanisms like speech act theory or the
ecological environment mechanism seem to be more appropriate for the state of affairs
in multi-agent modeling at this moment. A declarative, logical approach can fruitfully
be applied to the analysis of existing organization theories, pointing out the weaknesses
or even contradictions in those theories. Because of the complexities in the field of
logical languages, we  expect that the role of the declarative logical approach in
constructing new theories will be relatively small. Its power lies in analyzing theories,
not in inventing new ones. The construction of process models of  communication,
interpretation and learning seems to be a promising one for developing new
perspectives, models and theories for multi-agent systems. It weakness might be the
tendency to make overcomplex models in which it is difficult to determine the relations
between the variables used.
Our final conclusion has to be that plausible knowledge based multi-agent
theories do not exist yet. Ingredients and components do exist, but cognitive science as
well as OMT do not succeed in the complete understanding and explanation of these
multi-agent systems.
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